Binghamton University
June 7, 2024
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Democracy is fragile to the extent it relies on broadly held agreement that:
the rules of democracy are fixed and not up for debate.
losing elections is ok.
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democratic consolidation is when a “particular system of institutions become the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost.” (Przeworski 1991, 26)
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Democratic governance makes losing acceptable because losers’ rights are protected, and because losers will have future chances to contest elections.
“Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections … It is only when there are parties that lose and when losing is neither a social disgrace nor a crime that democracy flourishes.” (Przeworski 1991, p 10)
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Democracy is resilient when:
masses can organize and mobilize; even the threat of mobilization is powerful. Restrictions on assembly are especially dangerous (curfews, SoEs).
institutions can resist individuals to protect the “rules of the game.” Courts likely have to be central to this.
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Challenges to the “rules of the game” include:
elected leaders try to extend and overstay their terms.
leaders/parties try to change rules about citizenship, suffrage, or absentee voting to their advantages.
governments limit how civilians can oppose changes to the rules, e.g. through repression, states of emergency, curfews.
governments repress citizens.
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Versteeg et al. (2020) measure leaders’ attempts to overstay their terms in office since 2000; they identify 234 elected terms of which there are:
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| Attempts | Successes | Failures |
|---|---|---|
| 59 | 34 | 25 |
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Attempts to change who can vote have proliferated since 2010; the MERC data (Foote, 2023) show these efforts are frequent in democracies.
| Attempts | Successes | Failures |
|---|---|---|
| 265 | 173 | 48 |
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Attempts to overstay terms happen across regime types.
Attempts in democracies are considerably more likely to fail.
Democracies are most at risk for manipulation laws.
Manipulation efforts succeed at alarming rates, but face more resistance in stronger democracies.
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Organized protests deter overstaying attempts and increase their chances of failure; organized protests are more frequent in democracies than in other regimes.
Organized protests are associated with failed manipulation attempts.
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Outside the pandemic, SoEs are common way for leaders to limit dissent. Organized protest movements play an interesting role in SoE declarations.
Organization refines purpose and method of protests, and creates costs for repression. [This may mean organizers attract repression prior to protests.]
depends on limits to how far leaders will go to stifle dissent. To what extent will they ignore the “rules of the game?”
depends on mass mobilization.
may depend on elite opposition to leaders’ efforts to change the rules of the game.
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What mechanisms underlie democratic resistance to assaults on democracy?
What makes democracies able to normalize the “rules of the game” and defend them if necessary?
What mobilizes protesters in defense of democracy?
Does elite rhetoric signal challenges to the rules, changes in norms?
Are restrictions on protest, assembly a warning?
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Thanks - comments appreciated.
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Contact : dclark@binghamton.edu
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Slides available at: